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I. INTRODUCTION 
This Symposium rightly honors Robert Leflar's. immense 
contribution to the field of conflicts of law. He is most famous, 
of course, for his seminal work on "choice-influencing consid-
erations"1 and for his eminently useful treatise on conflicts.2 His 
long career in conflicts scholarship spanned two-thirds of a 
century, and his personal influence and scholarship touched sig-
nificantly all who write and practice in the area. 
However, Leflar's contributions to the legal profession had 
another side not as well-known to conflicts scholars, but perhaps 
of greater importance and influence in the larger world. Robert 
Leflar wore many other legal hats. He was a law reformer par 
excellence and a teacher and colleague of judges. He was a pro-
fessor, a law school Dean, and an appellate judge. He was, in 
short, someone deeply interested in both how the law worked 
and how it should work. 
This paper explores the relation between those two sides of 
Robert Leflar. In particular, we explore how his "judicial proc-
ess" side influenced his "conflicts" side, especially the choice-
of-law part of the conflicts side. The thesis is simple: Leflar's 
t The authors thank Roya Hanna for her excellent research assistance. 
* Jacob A. France Professor of Judicial Process, University of Maryland School of 
Law. 
** Distinguished University Professor, University of Toledo College of Law. 
1. Robert A. Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Choice-of-Law, 41 
N.Y.U. L. REv. 267, 279 (1966) [hereinafter "Choice-Influencing Considerations"]. See 
also, Robert A. Leflar, Conflicts Law: More on Choice-Influencing Considerations, 54 
CAL. L. REv. 1584 (1966) [hereinafter "More Choice-Influencing Considerations"]. 
2. ROBERT A. LEFLAR, ET AL., AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW (4th ed. 1986) [herein-
after "The Treatise"]. The first edition was published in 1959. Professors Robert Felix and 
Luther McDougal became co-authors for the fourth edition, published in 1986. 
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long association with law reform and judicial education led him 
to adopt a very pragmatic approach to judicial decision-making. 
That approach is reflected in his choice-of-law scholarship in a 
strong emphasis on creating a practical framework to guide judi-
cial inquiry, rather than on devising an elegant but unworkable 
set of rules designed to cabin judicial discretion. Leflar, in other 
words, tried to identify those factors that judges should use and 
actually do use in deciding cases, and then urged that those con-
cerns be used openly by judges. Doing so, Leflar believed, 
would both enhance predictability and make precedent more re-
liable. 
Leflar' s pragmatism also shows in his impatience with ar-
cane choice-of-law theorizing, especially given all of the com-
peting demands on a judge's time. As Leflar wrote in discussing 
various proposed methods of resolving choice-of-law cases, in 
what is perhaps the most quoted passage in his writing: 
[A]nalysis of governmental interests, dominant contacts, 
most significant relationships, principles of preference, 
choice-influencing considerations, and (often but not al-
ways) preference for the forum's own law would all ordi-
narily lead to the same conclusion as to who should win the 
case. Only states like New York would be so bedeviled by 
opposing academic theories that, attempting analytical in-
tegrity, they would let results be much affected by shifting 
from one modem approach to another. Most courts do not 
have time, or take time, for such nice distinctions, though a 
few, after preliminary fumblings, have adopted some one 
definite approach and have stuck with it? 
It is hard indeed to get more practical than that. Choose 
any academic theory you want, Leflar instructs the judges; they 
will all lead to the same result. Just tell your audience what you 
are doing and stick with it. 
II. LEFLAR AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 
Before examining the effect of Leflar' s experience with the 
judicial process on his conflicts scholarship, it is important to 
3. Robert A. Leflar, Choice-of Law A Well-Watered Plateau, 1977 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 11-12 [hereinafter "A Well- Watered Plateau"]. 
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consider that "other life," at least in summary.4 Fortunately, it is 
a relatively easy task to trace Leflar's roots in the judicial proc-
ess. Not only did he write numerous articles about many sub-
jects,5 including judicial decision-makin~, he also wrote a pro-
fessional memoir, One Life in the Law, which is both easily 
readable and highly informative. From these sources, Leflar's 
judicial philosophy emerges clearly. In a nutshell, he was a 
great believer in the ability of common law judges to reach sen-
sible results, if they are left free to do so and not constrained by 
artificial rules. The corollary to that freedom, he maintained, 
was responsibility-judges must state freely the true basis for 
their decisions in order to enhance predictability and account-
ability. The next few pages trace some of the influences on Le-
flar' s view of the judicial process. 
A. A Life in the Law 
Throughout his career Leflar immersed himself deeply in 
the myriad workings of the law. He was, of course, for many 
years, a professor and Dean of the University of Arkansas 
School of Law. Later, he also became a professor at New York 
University Law School (while remaining a professor in 
Fayetteville). But Leflar transcended the ivory tower.7 He 
served as the Arkansas representative on the National Confer-
ence of Commissioners for Uniform State Laws ("NCCUSL") 
beginning in 1945, eventually becoming a NCCUSL "life mem-
4. It is true, of course, that there is a chicken-and-egg problem. Did Leflar' s views 
on judicial process influence his views on choice-of-law or vice-versa? No doubt there 
was some traffic both ways, but we believe Leflar' s choice-of-law writings reflect his long 
pragmatic training in judicial process. 
5. Leflar's scholarship was both voluminous and multi-faceted. This paper only 
touches on some of his works, omitting some significant writing in torts and other areas, 
which a full examination of Leflar's jurisprudence necessarily would include. Among Le-
flar's work, for example, is a memorable article on the school desegregation cases, pub-
lished just before the Supreme Court handed down the decision in Brown v. Board of Edu-
cation, 344 U.S. I (1954). See Robert A. Leflar & Wylie H. Davis, Segregation in the 
Public Schools, 67 HARV. L. REV. 377 (1954). The article addressed, with a good deal of 
foresight, the implementation problems that would accompany a desegregation order. 
6. ROBERT A. LEFLAR, ONE LIFE IN THE LAW ( 1985) [hereinafter "ONE LIFE"]. 
7. These were perhaps contrary influences to his development as a legal pragmatist. 
For reasons that certainly need no explanation, service as a law school professor is not 
likely to make one a realist. To anyone likely to read this article, we have no comment on 
the salutary effect, if any, of being a Dean of a law school. 
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ber."8 A fully engaged participant in NCCUSL's work, he 
chaired the committee that drafted the Uniform Registration of 
Foreign Judgments Act,9 and was active in drafting the many 
Uniform Acts dealing with conflicts problems that NCCUSL has 
adopted· during the past half-century. Service as a NCCUSL 
Commissioner is likely to make one a pragmatist. After all, 
NCCUSL' s job is to turn out a product which can be sold to 
both legislatures and interested academic and practicing elites. 
A proposed Uniform Act long on theory but short on wisdom is 
not likely to have a long shelf life. 10 
Leflar also spent much time in law reform in Arkansas and 
elsewhere. Law reformers, at least those who persist, are prag-
matic b~ nature. Leflar helped rewrite the criminal laws of Ar-
kansas, 1 for example, and for a long time he directed a school 
for Arkansas legislators. 12 That latter task must have tried 
sorely even Leflar's sturdy pragmatist soul. One of his most 
prominent law reform roles was his service as president of the 
Arkansas Constitutional Convention in 1968, where he helped to 
put together a proposed new Arkansas Constitution, and later 
watched the proposal die because of special interest pleadings 
and voter indifference. 13 The description of this experience in 
his memoirs suggests that it was quite painful; not only was a 
great deal of effort wasted; but the manner of the proposal's 
death (voter indifference) must have been especially traumatic to 
a pragmatist like Leflar. 14 ... 
8. ONE LIFE, supra note 6, at 61-69. 
9. !d. at 233-36. 
10. The experience of one of the authors testifying before a NCCUSL committee con-
sidering the proposal that eventually became the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act 
confirms this. The committee was deeply concerned about how sympathetically trial court 
judges would view the suggested changes in interstate child support enforcement; any sug-
gestion that a trial judge would likely deem unfavorable received little support from the 
Commissioners. 
11. ONE LIFE, supra note 6, at 14. 
12. /d. at 16. 
13. Id. at 74-82. 
14. This trying experience, a serious attempt at constitutional reform followed by the 
same defeat at the polls, took place again in the late 1970s. See ONE LIFE, supra note 6, at 
20. 
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B. Training Judges 
Leflar deeply immersed himself in the everyday problems 
of judges. For example, he served on the blue ribbon committee 
that crafted and promulgated the Code of Judicial Conduct, a 
code eventually adopted in all fifty states. 15 Even more promi-
nent, however, was his role in judicial education. For three dec-
ades, beginning in 1956, he directed the New York University 
Institute for Appellate Judges, which ran a series of seminars for 
appellate judges. 16 The seminars, as might be expected, had a 
highly practical curriculum. Leflar was not one to waste the 
valuable time of a group of judges with ruminations about the 
nature of justice. He had more serious goals in mind, as an out-
line of the topics covered in a "typical" seminar makes plain. 17 
The seminars went beyond the usual updates and refreshing on 
new developments in substantive law and sought to train the 
judges in their bureaucratic capacity ("administration of. jus-
tice") as well as in proper decision-making techniques. The 
typical seminar devoted little if any time to legal theory. 
As a teacher of judges, Leflar thought deeply about the ju-
dicial function. He also absorbed the lessons that his judge-
pupils taught him about how they practiced their craft. This 
process was inescapable; Leflar enlisted many of the excellent 
judges who attended the seminars to help teach in the program. 
Frank Keniston of New Hampshire, Roger Traynor of Califor-
nia, and Walter Schaefer of lllinois were, according to Leflar' s 
memoirs, a few of the participants that made especially valuable 
contributions to the Institute. It is easy to believe that Leflar 
learned much from them. Moreover, the traffic apparently went 
both ways. In Clark v. Clark, 18 for example, the New Hamp-
shire Supreme Court adopted Leflar's choice-influencing con-
15. Id. at 46-49. 
16. He described the seminars this way: 
Two of these seminars, lasting two weeks each, are held each summer. The 
Senior seminar is primarily for judges of state supreme courts and of the United 
States Courts of Appeals, the other is for judges of state intermediate appellate 
courts. Some twenty to twenty-five judges plus five or more faculty members, 
mostly appellate judges themselves, make up the membership of each seminar. 
Robert A. Leflar, The Multi-Judge Decisional Process, 42 MD. L. REV. 722 (1983) [here-
inafter "Multi-Judges"]. 
17. See ONE LIFE, supra note 6, at 25-37. 
18. 222 A. 2d 205 (N.H. 1966). 
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siderations for resolving choice-of-law questions. The timing of 
that decision makes it clear that Chief Judge Kenison, the author 
of the opinion and one of the judicial teachers in the NYU ·semi-
nars, had been in correspondence with Leflar concerning his 
soon to be published scholarship on choice-influencing consid-
erations.19 
Last, but by no means least, Leflar was an appellate judge 
himself, having served on the Arkansas Supreme Court in the 
late 1940s. Although he had little to say about that experience 
in his memoirs,20 it is apparent from his later writings that his 
judicial career deeply impressed on him both the difficulty and 
importance of holdin~ together as many members as possible of 
a multi-judge bench. Again, that is a lesson about practicality 
and pragmatic advocacy-not theory. 
C. Leflar's Philosophy of Judging22 
What sort of judicial philosophy did Leflar' s judicial proc-
ess career produce? The answer appears clearly in the title of 
his most significant statement on the issue. An1one who writes 
an article entitled Honest Judicial Opinions2 is wearing his 
heart on his sleeve. . Leflar expressed his judicial philosophy 
quite often, and quite succinctly: 
An opinion that breaks new ground is more honest if it sets 
out that fact clearly, and does not pretend that it !s merely 
applying settled law. Lawyers and other judges can be 
misled by that pretense. [S]imply stated, neither precedent 
19. The authors are indebted to Professor Robert Felix for pointing out that the deci-
sion in Clark was issued late in 1966, and that the two choice-influencing considerations 
articles were published that same year. See supra note I. In other words, unless Chief 
Judge Keniston was really current on his scholarship, some back-door connection between 
the professor and the judge must have taken place. 
20. See ONE LIFE, supra note 6, at 16-17. 
21. This is most easily seen in Multi-Judges, supra note 16, at 727-30. 
22. Leflar's method of approaching judicial decision-making strongly resembles the 
"legal process" school of jurisprudence associated with Professors Henry Hart and Albert 
Sacks of Harvard Law School and their concept of "reasoned elaboration." See generally 
William L. Reynolds, Legal Process and Choice-of-Law, 56 MD. L. REV. 1371 (1997). 
The resemblance, however, must be coincidental-the result of great minds reaching the 
same conclusion independently. We can find no reference in Leflar's writings to either 
Hart and Sacks or "legal process"; and Leflar went to Harvard Law School long before a 
course in Legal Process was taught there. 
23. Robert A. Leflar, Honest Judicial Opinions, 74 Nw. U. L. REV. 721 (1979) 
[hereinafter "Honest Opinions"]. 
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nor policy genuinely justifies a result except as its own ba-
sis affords the justification. 24 
Characteristically, this statement advances functional grounds 
for judicial candor, rather than normative ones. An opinion 
should be completely honest-that is, it should state its facts and 
reasoning openly-not because of some a priori conception of 
the judicial function, but because judicial sleight of hand mis-
leads lawyers and other judges who must rely on the decision to 
predict future results. 
Leflar fully recognized that there are constraints on judicial 
candor. Group decision-making sometimes prevents a judge 
from writing the truest explanation of the decision; a multi-judge 
panel necessarily requires some compromise. Further, judges 
must work within the limits of what society will permit them to 
do. "Law," Leflar wrote, "is effective only so far as there is 
popular acceptance of it. Judges ... are aware of that fact and, 
to varying degrees, are governed by it."25 Judges, and their 
opinions, must be evaluated realistically. He noted of Cardozo, 
for example, that the "tradition" in Cardozo's days 
was that judicial decisions must be grounded on "legal" 
considerations altogether, and Cardozo could not com-
pletely escape from that tradition. But perhaps he did not 
really wish to escape from it. He recognized a practical ne-
cessity for tying forward-looking opinions into the prece-
dential past in order to make them acceptable to other 
judges, the bar, and even to a tradition-minded public. 
Cardozo did what he could in his era, and believed he was 
doing it in the right way_26 
Leflar similarly recognized that Chief Justice Traynor, de-
spite his "preference for the honesty of real reasons . . . at times 
felt compelled to write opinions in the language of precedential 
technicality."27 Traynor's strength, according to Leflar, was that 
24. /d. at 723 (emphasis added). 
25. /d. at 739. 
26. Id. at 724 (emphasis in original). This emphasis on the need to maintain historical 
continuity.as part of a judge's task was a recurrent theme in Leflar's work: "It is also part 
of law's function to maintain the society's historic and traditional continuity with its past, 
and it's the writer of appellate opinions who in our system is principally responsible for 
maintaining this continuity." Robert A. Leflar, Some Observations Concerning Judicial 
Opinions, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 810, 811 (1961). 
27. Honest Opinions, supra note 23, at 726. 
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he "sought to disassociate his own predilections ... by showing 
how the results fitted neatly into the regular framework of the 
law .... In a sense, he sought to cover up his realistic honesty; 
yet it showed through."28 Nevertheless, Leflar admired the 
judge who gave the true reason for the decision: "It was char-
acteristic of Holmes' way of thinking that the logic could be 
admittedly less than perfect so long as the real reason for the 
opinion could be identified."29 Leflar gave similar praise to the 
work of other judges, including Traynor, Schaefer, and Kenison: 
"Without integrity," he wrote, "there is no likelihood of great-
ness."30 
Not surprisingly, Leflar also was a stickler for openness in 
judicial procedures, and again, his emphasis was functional. He 
believed that public confidence in the judicial process would in-
crease if courts would publish the details of their decision-
making procedures. 
In several courts these [appellate] procedures, having first 
been definitely agreed upon, are published in pamphlets 
available to the bar and the general public. This enables 
judges, the bar, and interested citizens, including litigants, 
to know what the procedures are, which can add to any 
court's effectiveness by assuring public confidence in the 
court's collegial responsibility and integrity. The public 
can know, through the published procedures, that the court 
does operate as a court and not as a collection of one-judge 
d . . k 31 ; ~ ec1s10n-ma ers. ·,, 
Once again, judicial honesty and clarity help to insure public 
confidence; as a result, the publication of a court's procedural 
rules makes the court more effective. 
It should be obvious by now that Leflar had great faith in 
the ability of judges to do the right thing when left alone. Al-
though he wrote in his memoirs that legislatures were better at 
certain types of law reform, 32 it is doubtful that he believed 
strongly in that old bromide. Thus, in a remarkable (and over-
28. /d. at 727. 
29. /d. at 725-35. 
30. ld. at 729. · 
31. Multi-Judges, supra note 16, at 730-31. 
32. ONE LIFE, supra note 6, at 97-!00. 
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looked) article published in 1968,33 Leflar ask~d whether judges 
or legislators had done a better job of handling the switch from 
contributory to comparative negligence. In a conclusion that he 
himself found surprising, he contended that judges, rather than 
legislators, could better make the adjustment in compensation 
regimes required by the adoption of a comparative negligence 
rule.34 
The elements of Leflar's jurisprudence are easy to summa-
rize. A judge should express the real basis for the decision as 
clearly as possible, given the constraints of time and compro-
mise among the judges. The expression of true reasons leads to 
enhanced predictability, accountability, and public acceptance of 
the work of the court. Moreover, judges are hard pressed for 
time and lack the ability to keep current on jurisprudential 
trends. They should ignore these fads and follow their judicial 
instincts; absent artificial limitations, judges who do so will 
reach the right result. 
Ill. LEFLAR AND CHOICE OF LAW 
Best known in the conflicts world for his treatise on con-
flicts and his development of the choice-influencing considera-
tions, Leflar' s conflicts writings reflect a strong emphasis on 
reaching practical results and an .almost complete disdain for 
theory-exactly what we would expect from his background and 
his scholarship on judicial decision-making. Although Leflar' s 
views on choice-of-law, for example, like those on judicial pro-
cess, were mostly published late in his career,35 they were ap-
parently present from the beginning. In Leflar's very first article 
on choice of law, published when he was thirty-one, he ad-
33. Robert A. Leflar, Comment on Maki v. Frelk-Comparative v. Contributory Neg-
ligence: Should the Court or the Legislature Decide? 21 V AND. L. REv. 918 ( 1968). 
34. /d. at 931. 
35. Leflar poured out a steady stream of scholarship throughout his life. The great 
majority of it, however, published before he was in his 50s, concentrated on aspects of Ar-
kansas law. The remarkable outpouring of scholarship that began in 1959 established Le-
flar' s reputation as a national scholar. It is interesting to speculate whether Leflar' s long 
immersion in Arkansas law, followed by a spurt of national scholarship at a time when 
most academics are winding down, made Leflar a more practical writer. 
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dressed a seemingly dull but important topic-the notion that a 
court could refuse to enforce another state's "penal" laws.36 
Rather than formulate a grand theory to cover all types of 
"penal" claims, Leflar carefully examined each type of penal 
claim and asked whether it made any sense for a court to refuse 
to enforce it. He was quite aware that his probing for policy rea-
sons, rather than relying on established doctrine, was unusual in 
conflicts scholarship and, therefore, required a bit of justifica-
tion: "One trouble about a rule of law which everyone takes for 
granted is that no judge ever bothers to state the reasons for it." 
Leflar certainly was ahead of his time. Not only did that state-
ment reflect cutting edge judicial process (legal realism was then 
in its infancy), it far outstripped the then current choice-of-law 
thinking, which was still lost iri the Dark Ages, where it would 
remain for another quarter-century.37 
A. The Treatise 
Leflar' s treatise, his most comprehensive work in the con-
flicts field, reflects his judicial philosophy. Not only is it 
amazingly clear, but it is not larded up with theoretical musings 
and imaginary intellectual voyages. It does not require a grasp 
of jurisprudential theory to be understood. Instead, Leflar took 
each subject in turn, examined it carefully, considered the key 
precedent, and explained how the law in the area should work in 
order to achieve sound policy goals in a practical way. Even to-
day, when a number of excellent conflicts treatises are·· avail-
able,38 the lucidity of Leflar's work is remarkable. In 1959, 
when the first edition of the treatise was published, lucid con-
flicts writings were indeed scarce. It is no wonder Leflar' s trea-
36. Robert A. Leflar, Extrastate Enforcement of Penal and Governmental Claims, 46 
HARV. L. REV. 193 (1932). There are a lot of possibilities as to what constitutes a "penal" 
law; these possibilities range from traditional criminal law through taxes, administrative 
enforcement, and even the award of punitive damages. 
37. In his two years on the Arkansas Supreme Court, Leflar wrote only one opinion 
on choice of law, Pruitt Truck & Implement Co. v. Ferguson, 216 Ark. 848, 227 S.W.2d 
944 (1950). Pruitt was a somewhat disappointingly straightforward application of the lex 
loci rules. On the other hand, the facts of the case compelled the same result whether 
reached under modern or vested-rights analysis. 
38. Modesty, along with the fear of offending by omission, precludes our giving any 
examples. 
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tise rapidly became, and remains, a favorite with bench and bar 
alike. 
1. Choice-Influencing Considerations: 
The Historical Context 
Even more than his treatise, it is Leflar' s writing on choice-
influencing considerations that remains his lasting legacy to 
choice-of-law, theory, and practice. The two basic articles ex-
plaining Leflar' s views were written in 1966, and they were 
revolutionary. 
To understand why that was so, it is necessary to consider 
the state of choice-of-law scholarship at the time. In short, 
choice of law in the rnid-1960s was a· mess. 39 Less than a dec-
ade earlier, Brainerd Currie had upset the apple cart of the 
Vested Rights Old Believers, the conviction that a system of ter-
ritorial choice-of-law rules would eliminate judicial discretion 
and lead to perfect predictability of result. In so doing, Currie 
also exposed the lies that judges were forced to tell in choice-of-
law cases in order to achieve justice in choice-of-law cases, 
while adhering to the forms of existing legal doctrine. At the 
same time, New York, while attempting to modernize its choice-
of-law methodology, was undergoing the serious (and well-
publicized) embarrassment of chronic inconsistency in guest 
statute cases; and drafts of the Restatement (Second) of Con-
flicts of Laws were floating around, espousing its very curious 
amalgarri of resumptive rules and a "most significant relation-
. 40 
ship" test. 
Another part of the problem was Currie's own dogma-
tism-especially with regard to true conflicts. Like many revo-
lutionaries, he did not know what to do with the forces he had 
unleashed.41 He had brought Legal Realism into the staid world 
of conflicts, and he had announced a single great precept: In a 
false conflict case, the court should apply the law of the only 
39. For a quick review of this history, see Reynolds, supra note 22, at 1380-89. 
40. Leflar served as one of the Advisors to the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts. 
His choice-influencing considerations bear some resemblance, of course, to the list of fac-
tors, found in § 6 of that work, which the Second Restatement encouraged courts to exam-
ine in making choice-of-law decisions. Obviously, there was some relationship, albeit un-
known today. 
41. Of course, Currie's untimely death in 1965 prevented him from further elabora-
tion on his discoveries. 
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state whose policy could be advanced by the application of its 
law. When it came to the proper resolution of true conflicts, 
however, Currie seemed unable to escape from the awful deci-
sion to use forum preference as a tie-breaker. Currie believed 
that only a forum preference could be used to resolve true con-
flicts because that resolution otherwise required choices among 
values and polices of different sovereignties which courts were 
unqualified to make. 42 . 
2. Legal Realism and the "Considerations" 
The then-current state of choice-of-law theory did not sit 
well with Leflar, the Realist.· The traditionalists and Currie both 
placed artificial restraints on the judges' ability to reach good re-
sults via clearly articulated reasons. The restraints were differ-
ent, of course. For the traditionalist it was the rigid jurisdiction-
selecting rules of the First Restatement, and for Currie it was the 
supposed inability of courts to use policy judgments to resolve 
true-conflict cases. On the other hand, other approaches (the 
"center of gravity" method of the early New York cases and the 
"most significant contacts" method of the Second Restatement's 
early drafts) freed the judges from artificial constraints, but 
failed to provide the predictability required in conflict cases. 
Into this mix, Leflar threw his two choice-influencing con-
siderations articles, which announced a meth~4ology that 
seemed to solve the rigidity-unpredictability dilenuha''posed by 
the currently available choice-of-law systems. Like the ·free-
form grouping-of-contacts systems, it freed judges from artifi-
cial constraints. However, unlike those systems, it supplied 
judges with a set of criteria to guide their choice-of-law deci-
sion. Further, the guiding principles were not drawn from the 
metaphysics of vested rights or some ill-advised political theory 
about what courts could and could not do in a democracy. 
Rather, they came from the actual considerations that judges had 
always used, regardless of articulated methodology, to solve 
42. Leflar built on the work of others, and he carefully acknowledged his debts; to 
Cheatham and Reese; to the drafters of the Second Restatement (of whom he was one); to 
Currie (although the references seem a bit half-hearted); and above all to David Cavers, 
whom Leflar obviously admired, for his profound insight that "the choice of governing law 
should be a choice between the law as laws, and not between states without regard to this, 
for the content of their laws." ONE LIFE, supra note 6, at 212. 
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conflicts cases. Thus, Leflar maintained that the "major consid-
erations that should influence choice of law have always been 
present and operative in the cases."43 Ever the Realist, Leflar 
observed what courts did, not what they said, in choice-of-law 
cases, and distilled the considerations that actually controlled the 
courts' decisions. 
Like most conflicts scholars, Leflar knew that judges had 
long reached the "right" result in choice-of-law cases by being 
less than candid about their reasoning process. Judges, in other 
words, achieved justice in individual cases at the expense of 
honesty. What Leflar sought to do with the choice-influencing 
considerations was to bring the process into the open by distill-
ing from the opinions those considerations that convince the 
judges that a result was "right." ~ose considerations then 
could be listed and elaborated on to form a choice-of-law meth-
odology to guide judges in future cases. Supplied with an offi-
cially sanctioned conflicts methodology that was simply a list of 
the considerations that they had actually employed to solve con-
flicts cases, judges could be expected to write honest opinions 
indicating which of the considerations had motivated their deci-
sion in the present case. 
"Wiser judicial opinions and more thoughtful analysis ... 
may be expected if the considerations are given proper 
weight."44 Leflar's point was to be useful: "No American judge, 
trial or appeliate, has read anything like all of the specialized 
writings· on choice of law that a specialized Conflicts teacher 
must be familiar with."45 Their theme was simple. Leflar sug-
gested that judges should and do decide choice-of-law cases by 
examining a set of five "considerations." Those five considera-
tions, listed in no particular order, as Leflar himself made 
clear, 46 require that a court faced with a "true" conflict consider: 
(I) predictability of results; 
(2) maintenance of the interstate and international order; 
43. Choice-Influencing Considerations, supra note 1, at 267. 
44. !d. at 304. 
45. A Well-Watered Plateau, supra note 3, at 11. 
46. More Choice-Influencing Considerations, supra note 1, at 1586-87. The point is 
important; academic commentary has focused overwhelmingly on the "better law" consid-
eration, even though, as Leflar pointed out often enough, that was only one factor among 
five. 
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(3) ease of application of the law chosen; 
(4) advancement of the forum's governmental interests; and 
(5) the application of better law.47 
Leflar believed that judges had always considered these 
factors, but that they had been reluctant to state openly that they 
were doing so, because the Vested Rights Theory provided no 
acceptable method for deploying the considerations. Judges ap-
plied the five considerations identified by Leflar because they 
made sense, not because they had been held to do so. And, in-
deed, judicial use of the considerations was often implicit and 
not mentioned as such. Nevertheless, the considerations often 
played a key role in judicial thinking. By identifying and ex-
plaining what before had been done only as a matter of intuition, 
Leflar helped to encourage judges to trust their instincts and to 
display their thinking openly for the benefit of others. To quote 
Leflar: 
Results in cases will not often be changed by setting out in 
opinions real choice-influencing considerations instead of 
mechanical rules. This is because the real reasons have 
probably been there all along, whether they were stated or 
not. Understanding of the decisions, by students, by law-
yers and by other judges will, however, be immeasurably 
facilitated if the relevant considerations are clearly identi-
fied and openly emP.loyed. In addition, results will occa-
sionally be different.48 
That approach to choice of law should be familiar to any-
one who has made it this far, for it exemplifies Leflar's general 
view of judicial analysis: it requires an examination of what 
judges actually do in practice as well as what they say they do, 
and it gives litigants and lower court judges alike an idea of how 
cases will be decided. Not only does that candor enhance pre-
dictability in result, it also tells attorneys what ideas to advance 
for judicial evaluation, making it easier for the parties to help the 
court understand the issues. 
47. Applications of these considerations are discussed in greater detail by some of the 
other contributors to this Symposium. 
48. More Choice-Influencing Considerations, supra note I, at 1585-86. 
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Leflar elaborated the considerations in good common law 
fashion by using a lengthy set of examples derived from well-
known cases and designed to illustrate how the considerations 
apply, and better yet, when they should not be applied. Al-
though Leflar recognized that some critics might believe that his 
system delegated too much "flexibility" to the judges, he be-
lieved such a system to be good, not bad.49 
However, Leflar recognized that there must be some limits 
to judicial flexibility. Unfettered discretion is also bad. Leflar 
wrote, "The common law system works better when reasons are 
clearly identified and correlated than when they run wild. That 
justifies methodism, but without any pretense that everlasting 
truth is being revealed. "50 Hence, the identification of choice-
influencing considerations should guide, but never control, judi-
cial decision-making. 
3. The Role of Legislation 
Leflar' s writings make little or no mention of statutory so-
lutions to choice-of-law problems. It is clear that he believed 
that legislators had no special contribution to this most practical 
of litigation difficulties. On the other hand, when judges proved 
obstinate when it came to reaching sensible solutions, he was 
more than willing to enlist legislative assistance. Statutes of 
limitation provide the example. Even after modem, policy 
based methods of resolving true conflicts had won wide accep-
tance, courts continued to insist on treating limitations problems 
in the old way, as a "procedural" problem involving the routine 
application of forum law. Leflar, therefore, was instrumental in 
drafting and encouraging the adoption of the Uniform Limita-
tions Act, 51 which brought the solutions of limitations problems 
into the modem, policy-based choice-of-law era. 
In short, Leflar's views on choice-of-law easily can be 
traced directly back to his judicial process theories: openness, 
candor, and careful explanation are the keys to proper develop-
ment of the area. The justifications he advances for his ap-
49. Choice-Influencing Considerations, supra note 1, at 326. He also believed that 
some areas, such as cases involving land title, generally would retain rigid rules. !d. Most 
assuredly, Leflar was not rigidly doctrinaire. 
50. !d. at 325. 
51. 12 U.L.A. 296 (1997) (adopted in six states). 
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proach are functional-follow my program and better opinions, 
better arguments, and better briefs will result-as well as justice 
in the individual case before the court. 
B. A Puzzle 
Leflar's five choice-influencing considerations contain one 
significant puzzle, an apparent anomaly. Leflar's exposition of 
the considerations contains no hint of either theory or parochi-
alism. Rather, his tight focus is on the methods judges should 
use in reaching the right result in individual cases. Why then 
did he include "governmental interests of the forum" as one of 
his considerations? After all, that consideration certainly has the 
potential to bring parochialism and home court advantage front 
and center in the judicial mind. 
We suggest a practical answer to the puzzle. Leflar, the 
Realist, recognized that judges will always try to follow a strong 
forum interest, and if they are told that consideration of forum 
interest is not legitimate, they will still do it, but silently, without 
telling anyone what they are doing. Leflar did not want to dis-
courage courts from speaking openly about a factor they would 
consider covertly. Paradoxically, bringing advancement of fo-
rum interests out from under the rug allowed Leflar to advance 
arguments for discounting the factor in most cases. Having re-
assured judges that they could consider and openly discuss fo-
rum interests, Leflar was free to argue that "ordinarily differ-
ences in common-law rules between states do not represent deep 
and genuine differences in social policy. "52 In other words, few 
differences in the law reflect a real "governmental interest." See 
how sneaky Leflar was? Because it is impossible to refute an 
argument that judges are forbidden to make, he encouraged open 
discussion of the forum's interests in order to provide the op-
portunity to minimize it as a concern in almost all cases. 
IV. CONCLUSION: CROSS POLLINATION 
Earlier, we suggested that Leflar' s views on choice of law 
and the judicial process might have been a two-way street, that 
each might have influenced the other. The last section of this 
52. Choice-Influencing Considerations, supra note I, at 294. 
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article examines the lessons that such cross-traffic provides, 
both for choice of law and for the judicial process. 
The legal and academic history of choice-of-law provides a 
profound lesson for students of judicial process. The Vested 
Rights Theory, rejected by Leflar and almost everyone else to-
day, forbade judges to tell us what they were really doing: in 
other words the Vested Rights Theory required judges to lie, 
cheat, and steal in order to achieve justice. Choice-of-law prac-
tice became replete with "escape devices" and the like.53 The 
lesson, of course, is that a tight, rule-based system is doomed to 
failure from the start. This lesson, of course, is not ·unique to 
choice-of-law. Other examples of rigid rules that encouraged 
judicial dissembling include the classical doctrines of consid-
eration in contracts and contributory negligence in torts. On the 
other hand, the relatively flexible provisions of Article 2 of the 
Uniform Commercial Code have been successful in producing 
decisions that are both honest and just. Flexibility allows judges 
to do the right thing, and it should be chosen over rigidly con-
trolled judicial discretion. 54 
In short: Never go back to rules. Judges delight in doing 
justice, and most of them will try to do justice no matter what 
the stated rules may appear to require. Academics, especially 
choice-of-law professors, perhaps because they lack anything 
else to do, try to devise elaborate rules to control judicial discre-
tion. Leflar noted among conflicts scholars the "almost irresisti-
ble temptation for theorizing,"55 but ended with a strong caution: 
The courts, once they have identified a desirable result sup-
ported by good reasons, might as well phrase their opinions 
in terms of those good reasons, and forgo the theorizing. 
Especially if it turns out that conflicts law includes some 
brooding omnipresence in the sky, real reasons had better 
be set out to support them. 56 
Thus, attempts to devise new rules to permit judges to re-
solve choice-of-law with minimal exercises of judicial discre-
tion, such as the ill-advised American Law Institute Project on 
53. See Reynolds, supra note 22, at 1376-80. 
54. Choice-Influencing Considerations, supra note 1, at 325. 
55. Robert A. Leflar, The Nature of Conflicts Law, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 1080, 1095 
(1981). 
56. !d. 
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Complex Litigation, 57 are doomed to failure from the start. 
There should be no codification of choice-of-law rules58 and no 
resort to new forms of characterization to serve as a magic 
wand, as New York has tried with its attempt to distin§uish be-
tween "loss-allocating" and "conduct-regulating" rules. 
It is much better, therefore, to guide judicial discretion than 
to eliminate it. It is much better for a judge to state the real rea-
sons for the opinions so that other judges and litigants will not 
have to lie: candor and explanation above all else. 
57. See ALI COMPLEX LITIGATION PROJECT § 6.01-6.04 (setting forth a mechanism 
for resolving choice-of-law in complex litigation). The ALI makes factors such as the 
place of contracting, place of injury, and the parties' domicile critical elements in resolving 
choice-of-law cases. The ALI Project is trenchantly criticized in Louise Weinberg, Mass 
Torts and the Neutral Forum: A Critical Analysis of the AU's Proposed Choice-ofLaw 
Rule, 52 ALB. L. REV. 807 (1993). 
58. A few years ago, Louisiana did just that. For a sympathetic view of the Lousiana 
choice-of-law codification experiment, see Symeon Symeonides, Louisiana's New Choice-
of Law for Torts Conflicts: An Exegesis, 66 TUL. L. REV. 677 (1992). 
59. In Cooney v. Osgoode Machinery, Inc., 612 N.E. 2d 277 (N.Y. 1993), the court 
attempted to use the distinction mentioned in the text as an aid to resolving true conflicts. 
Because the distinction is wholly artificial, its adoption has caused a great deal of confu-
sion. That confusion should have come as a surprise to no one. 
